Following the payment of bail the three face-bookers have been released; a date for trial is awaited.
Defamation means causing hurt to the reputation of the person whether in printed or verbal form. However this has to be weighed in a democratic society with the right to freedom of expression.
In a democratic society citizens must be able to criticize their political leaders and governments and the democratic institutions, sometimes in the harshest terms. Where the intent is only to cause personal harm to the reputation of the individual, defamation could well be a cause of action for the one who has been damaged. Nonetheless, judges must weigh in the balance the right of citizens to express themselves openly and the rights of the individual.
The point here is that elected representatives at high political levels (such as the Presidency) should provide the example of tolerance which the Lebanese Constitution aims to enshrine. While technically the President may have a legal recourse, it would be less than exemplary to pursue them since this would undermine not only his person but also the very Constitutional qualities and values he is elected to protect and represent.
Nevertheless Lebanese defamation law is designed to serve those with the greatest power, especially politicians who make the law and also other sectors who find it most useful for their purposes. Amending the law in this respect and changing the way the legal system operates is an important and urgent element for today’s Lebanon.
The worst part of the Lebanese law of defamation is its chilling effect on free speech. The most effective penalty for telling lies and untruths is loss of credibility. Systems of communication are set up so that people take responsibility for their statements, have the opportunity to make corrections and apologize. This leads to loss of credibility if they are repeatedly exposed as untrustworthy. The Lebanese Defamation Law should simply respond to that as it purports to do.
In effect, pursuing legal action in the “The President v The Facebookers” may only serve to underline the harsh criticisms against which he feels aggrieved; especially when, within his Constitutional role, the President would be seen to only have acted in a personal capacity when he, himself, has been affected by criticism, putting into doubt his past inaction over the many years that politicians have openly engaged in the strongest and perhaps the most damaging of personal accusations, insults, and other forms of libel and slander. I am left to ask: is this indeed the role the Presidency is enshrined to represent?
I would advise the President, as a form of respect for the Constitution itself, to drop the charges.
